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Gergő Somodi
Department of Philosophy, Central European University
e aim of this paper is twofold. I criticize Michael Devitt’s linguistic—as opposed
to Chomsky’s psychological—conception of linguistics on the one hand, and Imod-
ify his related view on linguistic intuitions on the other. I argue that Devitt’s argu-
ment for the linguistic conception is in conict with one of the main theses of that
very conception, according to which linguistics should be about physical sentence
tokens of a given language rather than about the psychologically real competence
of native speakers. e basis of this conict is that Devitt’s view on language, as I
will show, inherits too much from the criticized Chomskian view. is is also the
basis of Devitt’s strange claim that it is the linguist, and not the ordinary speaker,
whose linguistic intuition should have an evidential role in linguistics. I will argue
for the opposite by sketching a view on language that is more appropriate to the lin-
guistic conception.at is, in criticizing Devitt, I am not defending the Chomskian
approach. My aim is to radicalize Devitt’s claims.
Keywords: linguistic intuitions, Devitt, Chomsky, intuitions, philosophy of linguis-
tics
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various
periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight
regular streets and uniform houses.
— Ludwig Wittgenstein
1. Introduction
ere has been a debate recently about linguistic intuitions in philosophy
of linguistics. While developing his linguistic conception of linguistics in
his book entitled Ignorance of Language (2006b) Michael Devitt attacks the
Chomskian theory on intuitions. Chomskians claim that speakers’ fairly im-
mediate, unreective judgments, usually concerning the grammaticality of
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the sentences of their language, are derived by some kind of rational infer-
ence from their knowledge of the grammar, that is, from their competence.
Moreover, Chomsky and his followers also claim that speakers have a non-
empirical privileged access to their competence. Consequently, intuitions—
being the “voice of competence”—are the best and almost only evidence for
the linguistic study of a given language. Here, linguistics is conceived of as
a branch of psychology, as is clear from the following lines of Chomsky:
Linguistics is simply that part of psychology that is concerned with
one specic class of steady states, the cognitive structures that are em-
ployed in speaking and understanding. (Chomsky 1975, 160)
As opposed to this “Cartesian” view, Devitt (2006b,a) claims that lin-
guistic intuitions are not linked to the language faculty, i.e., to competence,
since the linguistic data that are available to a linguist cannot provide a rm
ground for describing the nature of a psychologically real, innate grammar.
at is, we have no basis for saying anything conclusive about the way the
grammatical rules are represented in the minds of speakers.1 Accordingly,
Devitt claims that we cannot arrive at a good explanation of linguistic intu-
itions by referring to competence. On the basis of his general view on intu-
itions, he claims that linguistic intuitions are empirical theory-laden fairly-
immediate andunreective central-processor responses to—linguistic—phe-
nomena, based on little conscious reasoning, if any (Devitt 2006c, 491).
Consequently, linguistics should not be viewed as part of psychology; this,
of course, is not to deny that our cognitive make-up plays a crucial role in
our ability to speak languages. One just should not confuse conditions with
the thing the conditions are conditions for.2
In this paper, I will not discuss the details of this debate by going through
all the arguments step by step. Rather, I will try to radicalize Devitt’s linguis-
tic conception and his view on linguistic intuitions. According to his con-
ception, a grammar is not true of the psychological reality of the speakers;
it is true mainly of linguistic reality, physical sentence tokens of a given lan-
guage, and only true in a very minimal sense of the psychological reality of
the speakers of that language. Linguists should, therefore, examine linguistic
1 As Devitt (2006a) puts it in his responses to critical papers: “How does a grammar help us
with the theory of the competence? It tells us that there is something-we-know-not-what
within the speaker that respects the structure rules described by the grammar. is is the
minimal position on psychological reality that I later call ‘(M)’. But the grammar alone
provides nothing stronger than (M): it does not tell us what there is in the speaker that
does the respecting.” (Devitt 2006a, 576)
2 I do not mean to suggest that Devitt’s main argument against the psychological conception
relies on his view on intuitions. However, his main argument, as we shall later see, receives
some support from his view on intuitions.
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reality. While Devitt points out that they do so without his “advice” anyway,
he thinks it is just better to clear the eld of apparent conceptual confusions.
Admittedly, the linguistic conception roughly characterized above relies
on three distinctions—to be discussed below—and their application to lin-
guistics, as is clear from the following passage:
If the psychological conception of linguistics is to be saved, theremust
be something wrong either with the three distinctions or their appli-
cation to linguistics. It’s as simple as that. (Devitt 2006a, 576)
My claim is that if we really focus on linguistic reality, that is, on the prod-
ucts of language use, we have to realize that there is something wrong with
Devitt’s distinctions. In my view, the set of distinctions Devitt proposes is
likeWittgenstein’s ladder: once we have climbed it, we should throw it away.
Or at least so they are in the formDevitt puts them forward. In addition, his
view on linguistic intuitions, focusing as it does on linguistic reality, should
also be modied.
With the above rough sketch of a deconstructive move, however, I do
not mean to save the psychological conception. On the contrary, I want to
critically strengthen Devitt’s minimal claim about the psychological reality
of grammar.
In pursuit of that goal, I will rst present the details of Devitt’s argument
for the linguistic conception and his view on intuitions. Secondly, I will in-
dicate the reasons why I think his distinctions are problematic in light of
the conclusion he reaches on the basis of them. Aer that, I will show that
we still have good—even better—reasons to maintain a Devittean view on
intuitions.3
2. e linguistic conception of linguistics
e main topic of Devitt’s Ignorance of language is the nature of the psycho-
logical reality that underlies language; more specically, his book focuses on
the question whether the rules of a language, disclosed by its grammar, are
part of the psychological reality of its speakers. One of itsmajor claims is that
ordinary speakers can be and, actually, are ignorant of their language; in the
sense that they do not represent its rules in the way generative grammarians
suppose they do.
His argument in favor of grammar being true of linguistic reality rather
than psychological states starts with three distinctions. According to the
3 As far as I can judge, the adresse’s of Devitt’s criticism are not only Chomskyan linguists,
but also those philosophers who incorporate Chomskyan insights in their theory about the
connection between language and thought. In this paper, I will not discuss the bearings of
my objections to Devitt on these issues.
Gergő Somodi 143
rst, we have to
1. Distinguish the theory of a competence from the theory of its out-
puts/products or inputs. (Devitt 2006b, 17)
Devitt hastily explains what he has in mind with the following example:4
Horseshoes are obvious parts of the physical world. A study of them
will quickly conclude that they are made of iron, have a certain shape,
have holes for nails, and so on. e blacksmith’s competence is some
state of his mind or body that plays the central role in explaining his
behavior in producing horseshoes. Goodness knows what a study of
it would conclude. (17)
Aer giving this example, Devitt, moves on to introduce certain constraints,
“with an eye to two important features of grammar construction” (17, italics
added) as he says, on any theory of outputs. First, such theories should not
deal simply with the actual outputs, since there might be errors in perfor-
mance. Hence, the theory must idealize and abstract from error. Second,
the theory should be concerned with every possible output of a competence
(when working well).
So far, so good.e second distinction is the following:
2. Distinguish the structure rules governing the outputs of a compe-
tence from the processing rules governing the exercise of the compe-
tence. (18)
the example of the blacksmith is not sucient in itself to illustrate this dis-
tinction; hence, Devitt goes on to give other examples. First,
consider the output of a chess player: chess moves.e characteriza-
tion of chess moves must appeal to a rather elaborate system of rules:
a bishopmay onlymove diagonally . . .Chessmoves are rule-governed
in that something counts as a chess move at all only if it has a place
in the structure dened by the rules of chess. . . .A “theory” of the na-
ture of chess describes these structure rules. In doing so it describes
constraints on the appropriate output of a chess player. . . .e struc-
ture rules may also be among the rules governing the psychological
process by which she produces chess moves.eymay be among the
processing rules activated in the exercise of her chess competence.
However, this is not necessary and may be unlikely. In any case, the
key points are that being a structure rule, a rule governing outputs, is a
very dierent property from being a processing rule, a rule governing
the psychological production of outputs; . . . (18–19)
4 In what follows, I will quote at length Devitt’s theses and examples; rst, because I think
they are illuminating, second, because they will play an important role in my argument
against his view. It is thus better advised to eschew paraphrase, to avoid misunderstanding
and misrepresentation—the main fault Devitt ascribes to some of his critics (cf. Devitt
2008). Numbers in brackets aer quotations refer to page numbers of (Devitt 2006b).
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A second example is provided by formal logic, namely, the distinction be-
tween formation rules and transformation rules. Well-formed formulae [ws]
of such a system are characterized by formation rules as structure rules of
the system: “nothing counts as ws unless it accords with those rules” (19).
Processing rules of such a system are the rules that govern the move from
one w to another, that is, the transformation rules. Now, Devitt says
[t]hink of the formal logic as embodied in a “logic machine”.e ma-
chine takes ws as inputs, processes them according to the transfor-
mation rules, yielding ws as outputs . . .e outputs of this machine
are all in accord with the formation rules, but those rules are not the
ones that govern the process of producing them. (19)
Additionally, he describes how a “w machine” would work in order to shed
more light on the second distinction.is machine
constructs ws out of the basic symbols, the lexicon. is process
must be governed by the formation rules although in all other ways,
including selection from the lexicon, it would be random. us, in
generating a w, it might start by picking a certain syntactic form.
is selection is constrained by the formation rules but is otherwise
random. Next, for each category of term in the selected syntactic
form, it randomly selects an item of that category from the lexicon.
. . .e particular syntactic structure of eachw would be determined
by the particular formation rules involved in generating it. But notice
that the logicmachine does not generatews by this process. (19–20)
Devitt’s third—perhaps most debated (cf. Devitt 2006a)—example is the
dance of the bees:
Abee returning from a distant food source produces a “waggle dance”
on the vertical face of the honeycomb. e positioning of this dance
and its pattern indicate the direction and distance of the food source.
ese dances form a very eective symbol system governed by a sur-
prising set of structure rules. It is the task of a theory of the dance
symbols to describe these structure rules. Karl von Frisch completed
this task in the 1960s. In contrast, the processing rules by which the
bee performs this rather remarkable feat remain a mystery. (20)
ese examples comewith further constraints on the theory of the outputs of
competence. Besides abstracting and idealizing from actual use and encom-
passing every possible output, the theory should also abstract from proper-
ties of outputs that are irrelevant, for instance, being written or spoken. De-
spite all these abstracting moves, our theory of the idealized outputs should
enable us to make distinctions among non-ideal cases. As Devitt puts it,
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[m]oves that are not chess moves, formulae that are not-well formed,
and maneuvers that are not proper bee dances, can dier in their de-
gree of failure. For, they can dier in the sort and number of structure
rules of chess, ws, and bee dances that they fail, respectively, to sat-
isfy. (21)
Note that nothing that has been said so far is against the idea that compe-
tence should cause the output, i.e., that there should be a causal relationship
between competence and its products.
Making the third distinction, that is,
3. Distinguish the respecting of structure rules by processing rules
from the inclusion of structure rules among processing rules. (22)
Devitt describes an additional relation, which he calls “constitutive”.
is arises from the fact that the very nature of the competence is to
produce its outputs: producing them is whatmakes it the competence
it is. . . . So a theory of the outputs of a competence is automatically, to
that extent, a contribution to the theory of the competence, for it tells
us about the outputs the production of which is denitive of the com-
petence. And we can say that a competence and its processing rules
must “respect” the nature of the appropriate output in that, perfor-
mance errors aside, the processing rules must produce outputs that
have that nature. (22)
e term “respect”, according to Devitt, is a technical term here, applying
primarily to competence and its processing rules aswell as the structure rules
controlling the outputs of that competence.
On the basis of this constitutive relation, Devitt introduces his mini-
mal claim about the psychological reality of any kind of competence. Since
the theory of outputs must capture the structure rules that are respected by
the processing rules, we are not allowed, merely on the basis of the outputs,
to say more than that, as Devitt puts it, there is “something-we-know-not-
what” within the possessor of a competence that respects the structure rules
governing the outputs of the competence one has. From this minimal posi-
tion follows what Devitt calls the “Respect Constraint”: on the one hand a
theory of competence must posit processing rules that respect the structure
rules and, on the other, a theory of outputs must posit structure rules that
are respected by the processing rules. Moreover, Devitt thinks that we can
go further and claim that any theory of competence must begin with a the-
ory of the outputs of that competence. at is, from all that has been said
it follows that a theory of outputs has a certain explanatory and epistemic
priority over the theory of competence (cf. 23).
Devitt’s next question is whether these distinctions are applicable to lin-
guistics. If they are, he has an argument for claiming that linguistics, as a
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theory of grammar, should not be concerned with the psychological reality
of a given language, but with the outputs, i.e., with the linguistic reality.
It is not hard to see that the distinctions can be applied to linguistics.
We can conceive sentences of a language as outputs and claim that the com-
petence of the speaker to produce these outputs is his or her psychological
state; moreover that the theories about them should be dierent. e ab-
stracting and idealizing constraint together with the requirement that our
theory should concern every possible output of a competence can also be
met. In fact, as we have seen, Devitt introduces these constraints “with an
eye on grammar construction.”us, we can conclude that the rst distinc-
tion holds.
We may also distinguish between structure rules and processing rules.
As Devitt puts it,
e linguistic structure rules are like the formation rules for the ws
of a formal logic. Since we know the formation rules for the ws, we
could build aw machine that generatedws from the lexicon. Simi-
larly, if we knew all the linguistic rules, we could build a “sentencema-
chine” that generated sentences from the lexicon.is process would
be governed by the linguistic rules although in all other ways, includ-
ing selection from the lexicon, it would be random. . . . I shall em-
phasize that the processes by which the sentence machine generates
sentences are very dierent from the processes by which humans do.
(24–25)
If this analogy stands and, thereby, distinction 1 and 2 hold, it is a natural
and straightforward move to claim that distinction 3 holds as well. A theory
of linguistic competence and a theory of linguistic outputs must meet the
“Respect Constraint”.
On the basis of all that has been said, Devitt proposes his view:
a language is composed of the outputs of a linguistic competence,
symbols that are governed by a system of linguistic structure rules.
at is the reality of a language. And the task we have been contem-
plating, and that I wish to promote, is the study of the nature of that
reality. (25–26)
3. Linguistic Intuitions
e problem of linguistic intuitions arises for Devitt when he discusses why
he thinks his “contemplated task” is not alien to the enterprise of linguists.
He claims that linguistic evidence, “about which strings of words are gram-
matical; about the ambiguity of certain sentences; about statement forms”
(31) and so on, which are adduced for a grammar, bear directly on his theory
of the language. Here, a Chomskian could object that this linguistic evidence
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is mainly the intuitions of native speakers, which, being what they are, arise
from the underlying competence. Hence, on the basis of this explanation of
linguistic intuitions, the psychological conception can be saved. In Chapter
7 of his book, and also in a separate article (Devitt 2006c), Devitt refutes
this view on the basis of his general view on intuitions and by claiming that
intuitions are not the main evidence for linguistic theories.
What do we mean by linguistic intuitions in the rst place? As De-
vitt puts it, linguistic intuitions are “fairly immediate unreective judgments
about the syntactic and semantic properties of linguistic expressions, meta-
linguistic judgments about acceptability, grammaticality, ambiguity, coref-
erence/binding, and the like” (95).
Arguing for the psychological conception, the Cartesian theory treats
these intuitions as good evidence. But what is it that provides their eviden-
tial role?e answer is that, in order to get a good explanation of why intu-
itions are good evidence, one has to assume that they rest on speakers’ non-
empirical privileged access to representations of the rules of the language in
the language faculty. ey are derived from the latter by a causal-rational
process. is assumption can be supported by a certain view of intuitions
according to which they are generally a priori. e next step is that, since
there is no other explanation, one can infer to the existence of a psycholog-
ically real linguistic competence.
is inference can be good, as Devitt points out, only if there are good
reasons to accept the psychological conception independently of this expla-
nation of intuitions; otherwise, the argument can easily fall into circularity.
Devitt’s objection to this view, however, does not rely primarily on an inde-
pendent argument against the plausibility of the psychological conception.
His main claim is that we can have a better explanation of linguistic intu-
itions even if the psychological conception holds.
First of all, he agrees that intuitions are evidence, but also points out
that they are not the only evidence available. He claims that “the corpus”, for
example, can be a better source of evidence than native speakers’ intuitions.
en, he goes on to point out a tension in the Cartesian view of intuitions.
He registers a shi in the literature from a discussion about judgments of
grammaticality to a discussion about judgments of acceptability, goodness,
and the like.en he poses the following questions
(i) . . .Yet grammaticality is the notion from linguistic theory and so if
the intuitions are really derived from a representation of that theory,
shouldn’t we be relying on intuitions about grammaticality? If, in our
intuitive judgments, competence is really speaking, why doesn’t it use
its own language? What is the causal-rational route from an uncon-
scious representation of something’s “grammaticality” to a conscious
judgment of its “acceptability?” (ii) Ordinary speakers have many in-
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tuitions about grammaticality, coreference, and ambiguity, but few
about transitivity, heads, A-positions, c-command, cases, transfor-
mations, and so on. Why is that? (101)
is move to judgments about acceptability, as Devitt sees it, is the result
of the fact that linguists are pulled in two dierent directions in discussing
speakers’ intuitive judgments. First, there is the standard view characterized
above; second, there is an appealing alternative, namely that intuitive judg-
ments are the result of a “folk theory” and as such should not be included
among the primary data for a linguistic theory, just as any such theory-laden
folk judgments should not be included as primary data for any theory, or
so one might argue. e move to acceptability can be interpreted as an at-
tempt to remove this tension. But it cannot be sucient, because, rst, it
raises the above-quoted questions; second, the term ‘acceptability’ is highly
context-sensitive, so judgments concerning the acceptability of a given sen-
tence might include pragmatic considerations. But the proposed theory is
not supposed to be interested in considerations of that kind; actually, it tries
to exclude them from the eld of phenomena investigated by the preferred
linguistic theory.
Devitt’s move is exactly to place emphasis on the appealing alternative
to the standard view by introducing his general theory on intuitions into the
discussion. He claims that, just as every other judgment, intuitions in gen-
eral are theory-laden, empirical, central processor responses to phenomena—
in the case of language, to linguistic phenomena. e only dierence be-
tween intuitions and other judgments is that the former are usually imme-
diate and unreective and not based on conscious reasoning. Here, the term
‘empirical’ means no more than that intuitive judgments should be justied
by experience (103); whereas the phrase ‘theory-laden’ does not imply con-
scious theorizing, it only indicates that we would not make these judgments
if we did not hold a garden variety of background beliefs and theories. So,
there is a dierence, according to Devitt, between judgments that are formed
by theorizing and judgments that are theory-laden (Devitt 2006a). Intu-
itions, accordingly, are “usually and largely the result of past reection on
a lifetime of worldly experience” (103).
Examples are not hard to nd; Devitt’s own is a paleontologist nding a
white stone in the eld while searching for fossils and immediately judging
it to be “a pig’s jawbone”. “is intuitive judgment is quick and unreective.
She may be quite sure but unable to explain just how she knows” (104).
Aer giving examples, he goes on to examine whether this theory of in-
tuitions should be modied if the judgments concern products of human
skill or competence. is is important for the application of his theory to
linguistic intuitions.at is so because, according to Devitt, “it is very plau-
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sible to think that linguistic competence is a cognitive skill” (210, he presents
arguments for the plausibility of this view in a dierent chapter of his book).
Devitt’s answer is that the theory should not be modied. He writes,
[s]omeone who has the relevant competence has ready access to a
great deal of data that are to be explained. She does not have to go
out and look for data because her competence produces them. Not
only that, she is surrounded by similarly competent people who also
produce them. (106)
ese data, produced by herself and her companions, provide a very good
basis for some central-processor reection which, supplemented by appro-
priate education, can yield a theory and concepts about the data. Moreover,
it can produce the capacity for reliable intuitions about the data.
However, it is not necessary for such reection to result in an explic-
itly formed theory. As Devitt points out, “knowledge-how may not lead to
knowledge-that” (106). But even if it does, it does not mean that one’s com-
petence does provide a “Cartesian access to the truth” (106). One is privi-
leged only in his or her “ready access to” data, not in the conclusions he or
she “draws from the data”; because the latter are only “empirical responses to
the phenomena and open to question; they arise from empirical observation
of data” (106).
It is not hard to see that, just as with every other skill, a language user
may be described as surrounded by data produced by her and her fellows. A
competent speaker is enclosed
by tokens that may, as a matter of fact, be grammatical, be ambigu-
ous, have to corefer with a certain noun phrase, and so on. So she is
in a position to have well-based opinions about language by reect-
ing on these tokens. . . . Such intuitive opinions are empirical central-
processor responses to linguistic phenomena. ey have no special
authority: although the speaker’s competence gives her ready access
to data it does not give her Cartesian access to the truth about the
data. (108–109)
e theory has an interesting consequence: just as it is the paleontolo-
gist’s intuition which we should rely on about fossils, it is the linguist’s—not
the ordinary speaker’s—intuition on which linguistics should mostly rely.
4. Problems
Devitt’s conception, as is hopefully clear from the above discussion, is that
linguistics should be about physical sentence tokens governed by the lan-
guage’s system of rules. Linguistics also has to distinguish between struc-
tural rules and processing rules and lay the emphasis on the former, keeping
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in mind the “Respect Constraint”. On the basis of this, it can only hold a
minimal position on the psychological reality of language, namely,
(M)A competence in a language, and the processing rules that govern
its exercise, respect the structure rules of the language: the processing
rules of language comprehension take sentences of the language as
inputs; the processing rules of language production yield sentences
of the language as outputs.
e processing rules are of course psychologically real but position
(M) does not require that those rules involve the structure rules that
the processing rules respect nor that the structure rules are psycho-
logically real in any other way. (57)
Before raising my rst objection, let me summarize briey a prima facie
plausible view about language. According to this view, a language must have
elements—lexical items, say. It must also have categories into which these
items can be grouped according to their common features. e third thing
a language should have is the rules according to which the lexical items may
be combined. Moreover, rules and lexical items can be easily and straight-
forwardly separated; rules seem to be static, whereas, obviously, lexical items
may change.
at Chomsky held a similar viewmust be clear from the following pas-
sage of his:
Let us tentatively call a state of the cognitive systemof Jones’s language
faculty a “language”—or to use a technical term, an “I-language”, “I”
to suggest “internal”, “individual” since this is a strictly internalist,
individualist approach to language, . . .
e I-language consists of a computational procedure and a lexicon.
e lexicon is a collection of items, each a complex of properties (called
“features”), such as the property “bilabial stop” or “artifact”.e com-
putational procedure selects items from the lexicon and forms an ex-
pression, a more complex array of such features.ere is reason to be-
lieve that the computational system is virtually invariant; . . . language
variations appear to reside in the lexicon. (Chomsky 1995, 13, 15; italics
added)
Despite all his criticisms of Chomsky’s psychological conception, this kind
of view seems to be at work in Devitt’s conception of language as well. If we
take a look at the analogies he gave—that is, the “logicmachine”, the “wma-
chine”, and the example of chess—to illustrate the dierence between struc-
tural rules and processing rules, it must be clear that he conceives structural
rules to be given and capable of no variation, variation through continual
use. It is equally clear that he conceives lexical items to be clearly distinct
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from structural rules, analogously to the formation rules and the elements
on which a “w machine” operates.5
My claim is that if linguistics must really be about physical sentence to-
kens governed by a system of rules, the above view cannot be justied. My
question is: how are we to understand the phrase “system of rules”? If we
look purely at the physical sentence tokens, what is it exactly that tells us that
the system of rules which governs those tokens is analogous to the system of
rules a formal logic has? How can we be sure that this analogy does not put
us on the wrong track in examining the nature of the structural rules gov-
erning linguistic outputs? In my opinion, there is nothing that could count
as justier for this assumption, not even a reference to thought.
Let me give two examples to shed light on my claim: the so-called “in-
credulity construction”, and the process of grammaticalization. Consider the
following sentence tokens:
Him be a doctor!
My mother ride the train!
Her wash the dishes!
ese sentences must be prima facie wrong—nothing shows it better than
the spell check of any word processor—on Devitt’s view. ey are not pro-
duced according to the structural rules of English, or so one could claim. As
Michael Tomasello (2003) pointed out, while they are “ordered in canonical
SVO ordering, the S is in accusative case (Him, Her) and the V is devoid of
the normal agreementmarker for third person subjects (Mymother ride, not
rides)” (Tomasello 2003, 104). So, what are we to do with these sentences?
At a certain point in time, they must be treated as errors according to De-
vitt. Errors from which our theory of outputs should abstract away, as we
have seen. However, native English speakers would say that these are the
sentences of their language; they had no problem, I guess, understanding
what the speaker meant the rst time they came across such a construction.
So again, what are we to say about these sentences?
One possible answer, along Chomskian lines, could be that they are a
kind of idiomatic expressions; hence one could put them into the lexicon.
What goes against this solution is that the incredulity construction “is an
extremely productive construction; a native speaker of English can gener-
ate examples virtually ad innitum. It is also a totally abstract construction,
5 It should be noted that, as we have seen, according toDevitt, “the process by which the sen-
tence machine generates sentences are very dierent from the processes by which humans
do.” But, the dierence he has in mind has no bearing on my claim here (cf. 68).
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since most of these examples will share exactly zero morphemes, and so it
would seem to be rule based” (Tomasello 2003, 104). So, again, what is this
construction: an error? Or is it learned and in the lexicon? Or is it perhaps
rule-based and part of the grammar?
A plausible answer is, I think—and I agree with Tomasello on this—that
it is both and it is neither. “It is simply a construction of the English language
that learners must acquire by hearing exemplars and then generalize on the
basis of common pattern among those exemplars” (Tomasello 2003, 104).
But for this answer to be available, one has to give up any attempt “to parti-
tion the linguistic universe cleanly into just two kinds of entities: rule based
and unruly” (Tomasello 2003, 105). One should start instead looking at the
structure of language as something “emerging from language use”. Accord-
ing to this new perspective, “a community of speakers may conventionalize
from their language use all kinds of linguistic structures—from the more
concrete to the more abstract, from the more regular to the more idiomatic,
and with all kinds of mixed construction” (Tomasello 2003, 105).
Let me turn, now, to the phenomena of grammaticalization.6 As Bybee
(1998, cf. 2003) puts it, in the “process of grammaticization, a frequently used
stretch of speech becomes automated as a single processing unit and through
further frequent use, takes on a generalized and abstract function”. It “usu-
ally occurs as lexical items develop into grammatical morphemes, with con-
comitant changes in phonological and grammatical form, as well asmeaning
and function” (Bybee 1998, 252). A well-known example is the emergence of
the going to/gonna intention/future marker in English.7 According to By-
bee, in Shakespeare’s age, this phrase had only the literal interpretation of
the word, that is, it was used only in connection with a movement in sen-
tences like:
(1) We are going to Windsor to see the King.
Nowadays, uses such as
(2) We are going to get married in June.
(3) ese trees are going to lose their leaves.
are quite common, but, the interpretation based on the notion of literal
movement is not the appropriate one. In (3), ‘going to’ is a mark for the
future, while in (2) it expresses the intention of the speaker and his or her
partner.
6 Also called ‘grammaticization’.
7 For more examples, consult (Bybee 2003).
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Now, the question is: How is it possible for a verb, i.e., for a lexical item,
to become a marker of the future and, thereby, to occupy a grammatical role
dierent than is prescribed for it by the structural rules of the language, given
that the processing rules of “whatever-it-is” in a competent speaker that pro-
duces linguistic outputs must respect the structural rules as they stand? Or
again, how is it possible that an error should stop being an error through
continual use? When do the processing rules start to respect dierent struc-
ture rules, and what kind of respect is it that can simply change its subject?
It seems tome that itmakes very little sense, if at all, to talk about the “re-
specting of structure rules by processing rules” given that the above-discussed
changes can and, as a matter of fact, do occur in dierent languages. Con-
sequently, the third distinction—between the inclusion of structure rules
among processing rules and the respecting of structure rules by process-
ing rules—turns out to be vacuous, since change appears exactly when the
processing rules of linguistic competence produce something that is not in
accord with the structural rules governing the outputs.
ereupon, the constitutive relation expressed by the technical term ‘re-
spect’ is to be reconsidered as applied to linguistic competence. Whereas it
sounds plausible that a chess player’s competence should respect the nature
of the appropriate outputs described by the—virtually invariant—structure
rules of chess, changing inheres in the nature of the structure rules of lin-
guistic reality and, therefore, it is less plausible to claim that the same con-
stitutive relation, formulated in terms of ‘respect’, exists between linguistic
competence and its outputs. What counts as an appropriate move in a lan-
guage game is less bounded by rules than appropriate chess moves. A move
in a language game is rule-governed in such a way that something might
count as an appropriate move in the game despite the fact that it does not
yet have a place dened for it by the existing rules of that language game.8
As far as linguistic outputs are concerned, it is possible for an exception to
become a rule, and for a rule to become an exception.
Moreover, the “Respect Contraint” clearly cannot be met. It does not
seem to be fruitful to posit processing rules that produce only such outputs
that are in accordance with the structural rules at a given time. We simply
cannot capture how language works its wonders with this move. It turns out
to be impossible to explain how change in the structural rules occurs.
One might be tempted to draw two conclusions here. Firstly, given that
the distinction between the respecting of structure rules by processing rules
8 I use the phrase ‘language game’ here only to echo what Devitt said, i.e., not in the sense
Wittgenstein uses it, about chess moves in connection with the second distinction: “Chess
moves are rule-governed in that something counts as a chess move at all only if it has a
place in the structure dened by the rules of chess.” (18)
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and the inclusion of structure rules among processing rules is vague, one
might claim that, in fact, structure rules are some of the processing rules.
Such a claim, however, stands in need of further support.
Secondly, one might make the—somewhat related—claim that perhaps
it would be good to abandon the structure rule/processing rule distinction
altogether as far as human linguistic skill is concerned. For, rst, it might
turn out to be impossible to clarify the constitutive relation between the two
in a way that can address the problem of change in linguistic reality. Second,
it seems that language, in an important respect, does not group with those
examples—chess, formal logic machine, bee dance—by means of which all
the distinctions have been drawn. I shall not attempt here, however, either
to dene the constitutive relation with an eye on change, or to work out new
concepts that would provide a grip on human linguistic skill and behaviour.
In any case, Devitt’s minimal position on the psychological reality of
grammar, just as the abstracting and idealizing constraints introduced in
connection with the rst and the second distinctions cannot remain intact.
In my view, if the “Respect Constraint” is abandoned, a more radical mini-
mal position on the psychological reality of grammar becomes possible.is
is again something that could provide a topic of a separate paper.
5. Intuitions reconsidered
Note that none the above considerations go against Devitt’s claim that gram-
mar should be true of linguistic rather than psychological reality, and that
all of them are in harmony with his conception of language being a human
cognitive skill. All that happened in the course of analyzing these examples
was that an emphasis was laid on the physical tokens of sentences and an
attempt was made to gure out the system of rules that govern those tokens.
As a result, it is even in accordance with the core of Devitt’s view on lin-
guistic intuitions, i.e, that they are empirical theory-laden fairly immediate
responses to linguistic phenomena.
Although my criticism does not go against Devitt’s view on intuitions,
there is one element in it that should be spelled out; namely, that it is the lin-
guist’s intuition on which linguistics should rely. As we have seen, grammar
cannot be conceived as something given once and for all, it seems to change
through continual use. Judgments of grammaticality or acceptability must
change accordingly. But, fortunately, not only linguists speak the language,
and if others change the rule through continual use, and the change is re-
ected in the linguistic intuitions of those others, a linguist, if he or she is a
realist one, must respect it. Although these judgments will be theory-laden
and a linguist may come, through education, to have a better access to a
theory and data and, therefore, be in a better position to form unreective
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judgments—if they are possible at all aer habituation—, linguistic reality is
not like physical reality or the “reality” of the paleontologists, or of the chess
player, for that matter. Linguistic reality, like a city, is a social construct. Ac-
cordingly, what dierentiates linguistic intuitions form some other kind of
intuitions is the very nature of the reality with which they are concerned.
eir evidential role is a result of the make-up of that reality. Consequently,
unlike an expert in physics who can have better intuitions about physical re-
ality than a naïvemember of the common folk, linguists are in no way better
positioned than other language users.
6. Conclusion
In the rst part of this paper, I presented Michael Devitt’s argument for a
linguistic—as opposed to psychological—conception of linguistics, accord-
ing to which linguistics should be concerned with linguistic reality, and that
it should conceive grammar as being true of this reality composed of phys-
ical sentence tokens of a given language. I discussed in detail the three dis-
tinctions on which the argument for this conception relies, namely the dis-
tinction between (1) the theory of competence and the theory of outputs of
the competence, between (2) structure rules governing outputs and process-
ing rules governing the production of outputs, (3) between the inclusion of
structure rules among processing rules and the respecting of structure rules
by processing rules. All these distinctions come with certain constraints on
the theories for Devitt, amongst which the most important for my criticism
on his view is the “Respect Constraint”. According to it, the theory of out-
puts has to posit structure rules that are respected by the processing rules
and the theory of competence has to posit processing rules that respect the
structure rules.
In the second part, I discussed Devitt’s related view on linguistic intu-
itions. His claim that linguistic intuitions are fairly immediate, theory-laden,
empirical central processor responses to linguistic phenomena is in accord
with his view that linguistics should concern itself with linguistic reality. As a
consequence, he claims that it is the linguists’ and not the ordinary speakers’
intuition that should have an evidential role in linguistics.
In the third part, I tried to show that the proposed conception under-
mines at least one of the premises of the argument on which it relies. e
premise in question is embodied in the third distinction and the “Respect
Constraint”. If we focus on physical sentence tokens in pursuit of a grammar
true of linguistic reality and follow the constraint, we end up labeling sen-
tences considered and judged to be appropriate by native speakers as errors
or “noise”.is can be done only on pain of getting away from the linguistic
reality we are aiming at in our theorizing. In addition, it turns out to be hard
156 Ignorance Radicalized
to explain the possibility of change in the structure rules of a given language.
Consequently, in the last part, I argued thatDevitt’sminimal claim about
the psychological reality of language should be reconsidered. I showed also
that, given all this, his view on linguistic intuitions holds good with a minor
modication. It is the ordinary speakers’—and not the linguists’—intuition
we should trust.
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